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One question has consistently dogged studies of La verdad sospechosa:
whether or not García is to be viewed in a more or less favorable light or not.
Should his lying be seen as morally reprehensible or easily excusable? Is his
lying to be construed as a delightful exercise of the imagination or the osten-
tatious egotism of a flawed individual? This in turn raises the question of
whether the very disconcerting ending is acceptable or unsatisfactory. To
take it a stage further, what are its wider repercussions, for society or even for
literature? Is the play a satire on seventeenth-century society through his fab-
rications or, alternatively, is society in some way complicit in his mode of
life? In considering this subject –reconsidering it after many years in my case
(Ribbans, 1973)– I would suggest that many clues to elucidating these ques-
tions are to be found within the organic structure of the play in action rather
than in attempts at establishing an a priori characterization, rigid and
unchanging, of the protagonist. The sequence of events and disclosures, and
particularly the Aristotelian devices of reversal of fortune (peripeteia or
peripety) and discovery (anagnorisis) have a special relevance in a work con-
taining so many deliberate fabrications.1 The visual and dynamic effects of
the staging (costume, exits and entrances, gestures, position on the stage,
audience expectation, etc.), have a vital part, whether the play is presented
before an audience or experienced by a reader.2
Thanks to various erudite studies, the underlying sources of García’s
lying, imbued with classical, scholastic and Renaissance theoretical ideas,
have been adequately determined. Jules Whicker, in an excellent comprehen-
sive study, effectively brings out the significance of ancient moral disquisi-
tions for the elucidation of García’s conduct. He notes that García resembles
Aristotle’s boastful man, who claims more merits than he has. García also fits
in very well with Augustine’s fourth category of lying: his lies “are told ‘ex
mentiendi libidine’ (out of sheer delight in lying). According to Aquinas, lies
of this sort proceed from a habit (‘quod procedit ex habitu’) and are causedRECEPCIÓN: FEBRERO 2008 RILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156 ACEPTACIÓN DEFINITIVA: ABRIL 2008
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67). Finally, this scholar comes to a firm conclusion: 
If we consider García’s lies according [to] the distinction drawn by Aquinas between
cause, intent, and effect, we find: firstly, that they are motivated by arrogance and
vanity; secondly, that they are intended to deceive; and thirdly, that they cause injury
(albeit in the relatively mild form of shame) not only to others (don Beltrán, don
Juan, Tristán) but also to García himself. (67) 
Edward Riley had earlier indicated, in a fundamental article, the relevance of
Renaissance moralists such as Huarte de San Juan and López Pinciano. Even
though for them lying was relatively innocuous –if contemptible–, the
potential harmful effect is emphasized if it is allowed to become a habit.3 It is
in this context that Riley raises an important distinction between youthful
exuberance and an ingrained condition: “how far is D. García, as a case of
‘arrested development’ rather than grave depravity, responsible?” (290). Is it
“a natural disposition (inclinación) to mendacity or simply a bad habit (cos-
tumbre)”? (291). Such a distinction must be borne in mind in assessing
García’s culpability.
Near-contemporary definitions of lying are also revealing. Covarrubias has
a fairly orthodox censorious definition: Mentir: “Es no dezir verdad maliciosa-
mente” (800), while the Diccionario de autoridades is more bland, since no ref-
erence is made to a deceitful motive: Mentir: “Decir lo contrario de lo que se
entiende”. The entry under Mentira is even wider and would encompass many
words or actions by several characters in the play: “Expresion externa hecha
por palabras o acciones, contraria a lo que interiormente se siente” (2, 545).
Under mentira jocosa, a non-deceitful definition is admitted: “por diversión,
entre personas que se sabe o conoce que no tendrán por verdad el dicho,
intentando solamente causar risa” (2, 545).4 Jacinta no doubt has such a defi-
nition in mind when she speaks of lying as “donaire”: “Pasar por donaire
puede,/ cuando no daña, el mentir…” (2546-47).5
The early scenes of the play, before the actual falsehoods begin, plunge us
into this ambiguity about the nature of lying. In the excellent discussion
between don Beltrán and the Letrado, the latter passes from listing his pupil’s
good qualities –note that these include being “si repentino, impaciente”
(144)– to hesitantly admitting a vice, meekly described as “No decir siempre
verdad” (156). While distinguishing between “condición” and “mala costum-
bre” (159, 160), the Letrado nonetheless attributes his pupil’s persistent
mendacity to juvenile exuberance susceptible to reform. Don Beltrán, preoc-
cupied about his social standing, reacts strongly. Not only does he fear that
the vice is ingrained but declares emphatically that his fabrications will beRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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an early example of a critical view of society as a whole. Whatever the root
cause of García’s lying is, however, reform is not impossible.
It is also noteworthy that in a play about a liar Alarcón foregoes the obvi-
ous start of surprise available to him of concealing his protagonist’s defect
from the audience until he embarks on his first lie. Corneille, in Le menteur,
does not follow him in this respect. He skips the arrival scene in the capital,
with its disclosure of his failing by his tutor, and starts with an abbreviated
discussion of fashion and women between Dorante (García) and Cliton (Tris-
tán). Dorante’s situation is in fact very different. He is not the unexpected
heir to his family fortunes called back from his potential career as a scholar,
but decided on his own initiative to abandon law and go to Paris. As we shall
see, the changes Corneille made are revealing; more interested in maintaining
the classical unities and in unadulterated comedy than in moral judgment, he
tends to remove or blur some of the most original of Alarcón’s practices.6
The fact that García’s mendacity is previously announced converts the
members of the audience (or the readers) into accomplices of the playwright,
not of the deceived characters. Spectators and readers will be on the alert for
his lies from the start, even though they are kept in suspense for a consider-
able time before their expectation is gratified. Costume, too, has a part to
play. The contrast in dress from the typical student garb –“toga” and “ferre-
ruelo” (Oleza/Ferrer, 218)– García wore in Salamanca and on the journey
and the ornate fashionable clothes of a “galán” discussed in scene 3 marks the
contrast in manners and environment between university life and la corte; it
is emphasized by don Juan’s failure at first to recognize him: “Veros en
Madrid lo hacía, / y el nuevo traje … / Más galán sois de seglar / que de estu-
diante lo fuistes” (595, 599-600). The abrupt change of circumstances
accounts for García’s eager concern with fine clothes and the latest fashion.
The audience is brought to consider visually as well as verbally how influen-
tial his very different youthful experiences in Salamanca may be in his pro-
pensity for lying.
Scene 2 also places a great deal of emphasis on his father and his reaction.
The revelation induces such alarm in don Beltrán that he rushes into a deceit
of his own, precipitating one of the crucial developments of the action: his
proposal, without consultation, to marry his son off to Jacinta. It also inau-
gurates the important motif of how a gentleman of high social status who
obviously commands great authority, seasoned in dispensing favors and hav-
ing an apparently wordly-wise sagacity about human failings, turns into a
dupe who has to acquiesce in events over which he no longer has any con-
trol. In Le menteur, the plot construction is much looser. Géronte (don Bel-RILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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motivation for proposing the marriage; it is simply an arbitrary decision by
an authoritarian parent. As he has not yet learnt about Dorante’s compulsive
lying, Géronte has no cause to rebuke his son before he is deceived by the
marriage lie; and he discovers the deception through a friend, not through
Alcippe (don Juan).
A small but telling dramatic detail is that the crucial information about
García’s lying is withheld from Tristán, since he leaves the stage with García
before the Letrado’s disclosure. Tristán, who is well educated and experienced
in the ways of the world, demonstrates these qualities in his comments on
fashion and his racy advice on women before he is aware of his master’s
defect. They are thus of general application for society as a whole, as well as
for the young heir just arrived in Madrid. The apparently casual anecdote
about the gentleman who covers his scars (presumably from smallpox) with
the wide brimmed collar so much the current fashion is significant for the
whole play:
Con un cuello apanalado,
¿qué fealdad no se enmendó?
Yo sé una dama a quien dio
cierto amigo gran cuidado
mientras con cuello le vía,
y una vez que llegó a verle 
sin él, la obligó a perderle
cuanta afición le tenía,
porque ciertos costurones
en la garganta cetrina
publicaban la ruina
de pasados lamparones. (241-52)
García’s defect is not physical but no less real. On the vexed question of incli-
nación versus costumbre, it tilts the balance slightly, by referring to a perma-
nent condition, in favor of inclinación. Lying, like disfiguring scars, could
easily put off potential spouses, as occurs with the lady in Tristán’s account,
or their guardians, as don Beltrán feared; and the whole story neatly pin-
points, not only the type of deception that contemporary society perpetrates
automatically to shun awkward problems, but more specifically what don
Beltrán will attempt to do about his son’s lying: cover it up until he is safely
married off. García, incidentally, disapproves of the extravagant fashion but,
as Tristán observes, such criticism does not prevent galanes, the recently
joined García among them, from following the tide, thus, by implication,RILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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contemporary controversy that demonstrates the play’s capacity to refer to
García’s specific situation and Madrid aristocratic society in the same breath.
Tristán’s extended, amusing and cynical astrological satire is unequivocally
a splendid set piece of social satire, conveying a generalized message that
appearances deceive and that money buys sexual favors from ladies through-
out society, outwardly virtuous or not. It applies only marginally to García’s
situation, for though “tierno” (290), his attention is directed entirely to
respectable unmarried ladies. Only in the specific advice that money is what
counts does it impinge on his conduct. Nor can Tristán’s satire be applied to
Jacinta and Lucrecia, whom the audience has not yet encountered and who
are the only ladies of rank in the play. They can hardly be included among
the carefully graded ranks of mostly married women of dubious morality;
one would expect to find them, if at all, among “Las señoras… que son ánge-
les a quien / no se atreve el pensamiento” (301, 303-04). There is however
possibly an anticipation of the fact that Jacinta will not seem adverse to
receiving gifts from García so long as don Juan does not witness it. 
Alan Paterson rightly attaches great importance to this solo performance as
a medium for satirizing society and goes on to claim the same qualities for
García’s lies as autonomous solo performances. He argues powerfully and con-
vincingly that each of the lies has a specific social reference. It is indeed signifi-
cant that the lies apply to relevant issues of the time: the influx of riches from
America –“the indiano, epitome of upstart wealth”– (363); the elaborate ban-
quet on the river is satirized, Paterson plausibly suggests, as reflecting the
increasing official hostility to luxurious entertaining (364); the close connec-
tion of marriage with nobility, of which García’s lie is a “wicked mockery”
(1984: 364); and the duel, which he sees as “one of the traditional rituals
enacted in the name of worth” (365). By treating the lies as “autonomous,”
however, Paterson fails to relate them to the story of García himself.
Obviously, great importance attaches to the virtuosity of the lies them-
selves. The same scholar, rightly conscious of the scenic quality of the play,
gives a good description of the fabrications “as acts of high theatricality,
whose relationship with the spontaneous brilliance of improvisation is sug-
gested by the adverbial ‘de repente’ that is used on at least three occasions to
convey admiration at García’s skill” (Paterson 362-63).7 García’s lies have a
twin effect throughout; they have a verve and an imaginative power that goes
beyond mere verisimiltude (Whicker 54-55). They belie the assumption that
the ex-student cannot hold his own in deception in Madrid, though a skepti-
cal don Félix puts this in doubt, but at the same time the stories can easily be
disproved; this combination is clearly one of the endearing features for theRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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awaits expectantly their refutation.
The imaginative quality of García’s fictions is not however the only factor.
Much of the humor depends on something that is often underrated: how the
characters who are deceived react and what is the effect on the hero of the
subsequent, and inevitable, moment of truth, or escarmiento. His actions
cause significant anxieties to each of the principal characters that call for a
reasoned response; and these responses, by don Beltrán, don Juan, Jacinta,
Lucrecia, even Tristán, are essential to the impact of the play as a whole.
As his master approaches Jacinta, Tristán spells out his cynical advice
twice more (“es el polo el dinero”[416], ”Que a la mujer rogando/ y con el
dinero dando” [430-31]). García puts his suggestions into practice, but in his
own way, and with the utmost recklessness. Tristán’s unawareness as yet of
García’s vice makes for good stage action, as the audience, knowing more
than he does, witnesses his utter astonishment at García’s outburst of fabrica-
tions. Moreover, his warning, “Mucho te arrojas…” (527), is addressed
directly to his master’s rashness in making extravagant promises: lying is not
the only problem. García’s own consternation, evident on the stage in the
exchange of asides, is both a mark of inexperience (associated with his being
“bisoño”) and a sign of imprudence. The notion of “arrojarse”, which
Whicker acutely associates with Aquinas’ concept of praecipitatio (71, n. 55),
is reiterated throughout the play. It is the negative counterpart to a quality
that is of cardinal importance: Prudence. Whicker shows clearly that García
lacks the essential components of Prudence, as defined by Aquinas: 
he lacks both memoria and entendimiento [intellectus] and […] he habitually subordi-
nates reason (razón) to appetite (gusto). That he also lacks foresight [providentia], cir-
cumspection [circumspectio] and caution [cautio], is evident in his propensity to lie
without thought to the consequences of his lies, and his tendency to lay himself open
to discovery at every turn. (70) 
The first meeting with Jacinta (1, 4) is well contrived. The conventional the-
atrical device of her stumbling enables García to offer her, literally, his hand,
with all that this implies as a forecast of a definite commitment. Symboli-
cally, García has obtained what he wants without effort; his subsequent
actions are what cause the frustration of his aims. The conversation that fol-
lows, with its specific references to “alcanzar” y “merecer,” also raises in antic-
ipation an important subject: the relation between ends and means. His
insistence on requiring to deserve this success as well as to achieve it is in
ironic contrast with his statement shortly afterwards that any means will doRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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leaves an excellent impression on Jacinta. 
The story about the banquet (1, 7) is not far from fitting the more harm-
less mode of lying, such as the mentira jocosa. Indeed, it might have been
permissible as a tour de force had García immediately confessed his storytell-
ing at the end; instead, even when he later reassures don Juan (2, ii) that the
banquet was not devoted to Jacinta, he maintained his deceit. No less strik-
ing visually, at the end of the scene, is the incipient tension between the two
galanes, which reveals García’s insensitivity to don Juan’s increasing disquiet.
This is vividly demonstrated by the curt farewell and ultra-abrupt departure
of them both. It is one example of the meticulous stage-positioning charac-
teristic of the play.
After these preliminary actions comes the explanation that García pro-
vides to the astonished Tristán of his propensity for lying, an intellectualized
justification of his conduct that should be taken seriously. First, García
declares that he is not prepared to brook anything that arouses his envy or
his “admiración,” a term that embraces wonder as well as admiration:8
Fingilo porque me pesa
que piense nadie que hay cosa
que mover mi pecho pueda
a invidia, o admiración,
pasiones que al hombre afrentan:
que admirarse es ignorancia,
como invidiar es bajeza. (838-44)
The fallacy of the argument is clear. Envy is one of the seven deadly sins and
is the result of a moral inadequacy: desiring an object or a quality others have
that one does not possess oneself; it gives offense (“afrenta”) and can be
equated with “bajeza” only when one yields to it. Similarly, the sense of won-
der, the primary meaning of “admiración,” would seem to proceed from a
lack of experience that lays bare the ignorance of which he is ashamed. It is a
sign, as Louise Fothergill-Payne indicates, of what in modern times will be
called an inferiority complex (591). His fabrication about the banquet exem-
plifies exactly both his envy and his desire for admiration, as well as fitting the
boastful model seen in Aristotle and Augustine. He is beginning to confirm
Whicker’s assessment of his character, according to Aquinas’ criteria. Arrogant
egoism combined with recklessness is apparent, but whether or not it is the
temporary aberration of youth or a more permanent condition is not settled.
Then García takes his argument further, in the much-quoted lines: RILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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quien sólo el número aumenta
y hace lo que todos hacen,
¿en qué difiere de bestia?
Ser famosos es gran cosa,
el medio cual fuere sea;
nómbrenme a mí en todas partes
y murmúrenme siquiera:
pues uno, por ganar nombre,
abrasó el templo de Efesia. (857-66)
This important passage brings up the typical Renaissance subject of fame.9 A
significant component is the constant debate about whether it is morally
preferable to live for fame or in unobtrusive modesty, reflected of course in
the Don Quixote/ Alonso Quijano dichotomy.10 Again, Garcia’s reasoning is
fallacious: modest living out of the public eye, recommended incidentally by
don Beltrán (2, 4), has a long and positive ancestry as aurea mediocritas; it
certainly has little to do with resembling an animal devoid of reason. What he
is declaring is that he seeks an end-result, reputation, reduced to nothing
more than being talked about, from any sort of action, even of such a ques-
tionable quality as to make him the object of slander (“murmúrenme siqui-
era”), a vice Alarcón was very conscious of, as Las paredes oyen attests. More-
over, in asserting that the means of attaining renown are unimportant, he
identifies himself, without naming him, with Herostratus, the paradigm of
infamy.11 Herostratus stands for iniquitous destruction, the senseless burning
of one of the Seven Wonders of the World, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus,
for the sake of self-aggrandizement; it is the extreme application of envious
pride. García is not of course in this class of iniquity, but for him to quote
Herostratus as an example, however illusively, is to risk putting himself into
the worst category of lyers, beyond the pale of acceptable honorable conduct.
If the end is despicable –fame or infamy at all costs–, the means take on a
hardly less pernicious caste, through the uncontrollable mendacity used to
achieve it, as well as entailing, in the real world of pragmatic values, the dan-
ger of losing credit or trust among one’s peers. By this point in Act 1, then,
we are led, without full certainty however, towards accepting the more serious
response regarding his motivation: that it is the result of ingrained arrogance
rather than youthful exuberance.
Finally, García offers a less intellectual argument: his “gusto,” which is
similarly equivocal. This justification, reiterated many times in the course of
the play, may be a temporary symptom of the self-indulgence of his carefreeRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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shown (71). 
The rest of Act 1 deals with the consequences of his lies on other charac-
ters: Beltrán’s neatly handled surprise visit to Jacinta’s home to make his pro-
posal; Jacinta’s great caution, in part through her attachment to don Juan, in
not accepting don Beltrán’s attractive offer of his son’s hand without investi-
gating further; when she does so in Act 2, scene 8, she will discover (another
dramatic jolt of surprise, another anagnorisis) that he is the feigned indiano
she found attractive. Though she concludes that it is practically a settled
matter, she keeps her options open. When confronted by the furious don
Juan, she tries to conciliate him, but will not compromise herself by giving
him her hand (once more, a symbol of commitment); instead she concocts a
strategic falsehood by declaring, in a well-staged conclusion to the act, that
her uncle is coming, reversing what she had just said.
In Act 2, when a reluctant Tristán reveals García’s batch of lies to don Bel-
trán, the two explanations: “caprichos juveniles/ con arrogancia imprudente”
(1239-40), are fused without being resolved. The basis of Beltrán’s recrimina-
tions to García is, as is to be expected, earnest and conventional: nobility
depends on noble actions and can be lost by ignoble ones. This, his second
attempt at understanding the temptations of vice, is in itself entertaining
enough, as he goes through systematically, as if well acquainted with them, the
attractions of most of the seven deadly sins, plus gaming and theft. The only
sin missing is envy, precisely the one that lacks the desirable qualities of
“gusto” and “provecho” in Beltrán’s catalogue of priorities. Implicitly, there-
fore, it is envy that gives lying its distinctive vileness.12 García, for his part,
answers with a straight denial –another falsehood– followed by a puzzled truc-
ulence; with his usual lack of forward planning, he is unaware that his reputa-
tion has followed him from Salamanca. The reprimand has no impact on him
and he has no compunction in following the rebuke with the longest and most
elaborate of his lies, though he does have to hone his skills on this occasion.
The deception is much more serious than any of the others. Provoked by
the desire to get out of an apparently awkward situation,13 it is, in Aquinas’
terms, not only calculated to deceive on an important matter but potentially
injurious. At the same time it is amusing, graphic in detail, and well struc-
tured to be enacted with verve on the stage, with such spectacular devices as
the clock that strikes the hour, the pistol that goes off and the siege of the
bedroom. And there is a comic irony here, for the scenario is hardly designed
to meet with don Beltrán’s approval: a blatant seduction, an imagined family
that, although allegedly noble, is poor –in this society so preoccupied with
money14– has little attraction, though the story may engage the imaginationRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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invention is inherently implausible and will inevitably be uncovered. Its will-
ing acceptance by Beltran corresponds to an understandable mindset that
cannot conceive that his son would have the arrant audacity to deceive him
after his reprimand. Yet the fact that he swallows it whole betrays Beltrán’s
naivety, despite his professed worldliness, and continues the undermining of
his authority. As for García, to the imprudence and the impudence of the lie
itself is added his evident disdain for “el viejo,” which goes beyond any nor-
mal disrespect of the older generation by the young, as he gloats about a
story that has in his eyes both “gusto y provecho”. 
The duel scene with don Juan brings in another example of impetuosity
(“arrojarse” again) in a character whom Whicker (71-72) sees as the counter-
figure to García. Don Juan overcomes his rash behavior, while García, ironi-
cally, does not hesitate to criticize him for it. Moreover, he matches his oppo-
nent’s arrogant valor by insisting on carrying on the duel once his opponent
is satisfied, benefiting the spectators with a bit of stage-fighting. At the same
time he adds to his reputation as a liar with a supplementary falsehood, that
the banquet’s recipient was a married woman (a reminiscence of Tristán’s sat-
ire). The whole fabrication is speedily demolished by don Félix, who also
undermines his plausibility as a liar. We are faced with a galán with the con-
trasting characteristics of bravery (denoting nobility) and lying (a debasing
habit). Still unresolved is the question of whether the latter is a costumbre or
a character trait, but a new derogatory term is now attached to him: “embus-
tero,” denoting a more serious form of lying, in which calculated deceit is an
essential part.15
The same taint of “embustero” sullies his relations with Jacinta and
Lucrecia. In the interview called by Lucrecia, García makes a sustained effort
and does not lie, but he cannot break through the confusion produced by
the mistake of names. By the end of the act the sense of bewilderment
among the characters has reached its peak. Lucrecia is confused, Jacinta
indignant, García frustrated at not being believed when he is telling the
truth. He has suffered the humiliation at Jacinta’s hands of being “mal acred-
itado” and punished by having his whole repertoire of lies rehearsed one by
one before him (2, 16). It might be thought that this escarmiento would be
sufficient to produce a change of conduct. In the last words of the act, Tris-
tán draws the moral all too clearly: “quien en las burlas miente,/ pierde crédi-
to en las veras” (2150-51), but it is not clear whether García is listening. The
unsolved question at this stage, it seems to me, is whether García is going to
stop lying, from repentance or calculation, and so justify morally a happy
ending. This in turn depends on how ingrained his failing is. If the costumbreRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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nious and conventional solution to emerge in the final act. This solution is
exactly what is supplied in Le menteur, where Corneille, considering the con-
clusion “un peu dure” and little to the taste of his public (“Examen du Ment-
eur”, 294), opts for an ending that is at once more implausible and more
orthodox: an abrupt and insufficiently justified change in Dorante’s affec-
tions from Clarice (Jacinta) to Lucrèce (Lucrecia).
It is therefore of special interest to explore the extent to which García has
evolved in the course of the action. Riley inclines to the opinion that García
is on the mend: “the signs are hopeful … There is enough discreción in his
character to suggest the likelihood of reform” (296), but, troubled by a lack
of clear indications, he concludes that “[t]he play is clumsily contrived in
several respects” (296). I do not share this view, which does not fully appreci-
ate that the deliberate uncertainty created about how tenacious García’s lying
propensity is conditions the audience’s (or the reader’s) response in a way
that resonates constantly throughout the play. It has a profound dramatic
purpose, for it keeps the audience in suspense between enjoyment of the
imaginative flair of the lies and the moral implications of his conduct. The
two interlinked questions that automatically arise are: Will he get away with
it? Will he reform?
In Act 3 the focus turns to Lucrecia, the recipient of García’s attentions in
Jacinta’s name. Speculating on García’s possible love for her, she indulges in
some deception of her own, through Camino and Tristán, with her false
message about how she reacted to García’s letter. Expressing her hopes of
redeeming him, she too keeps her options open. To Jacinta, she admits to
being between “enamorada” and “curiosa.” In the continued confusion of the
well articulated Magdalena scene (3, 5-6), in which García and Tristán see
Jacinta reading the letter in which García committed himself to Lucrecia as
“tu esposo, Don García” (2459), the two ladies become suspicious of each
other. Even truth by the “embustero” breeds distrust.
The further falsehoods García indulges in (about his imaginary wife’s preg-
nancy and the mistake he makes about the name of his false father-in-law), are
dependent on the marriage lie and do not add to the deceit. Various indica-
tions are given that his love is genuine and passionate: Camino sees him prowl-
ing round Lucrecia’s house (3, 1), and with a new fastidiousness he rebukes
Tristán’s no-nonsense materialism in advising him, once more, to give his lady
presents. Even from him, the strength of his amorous bewilderment (“ni
conozco el que soy, / ni me acuerdo del que fui” [2514-15]) seems convincing.
Then comes the Tristán lie, which is of a different order from the others.
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Paterson brings out its theatrical force as “a real show-stopper” (365) in the
swashbuckling mode, but critics have paid little attention to its place in the
play’s structure, no doubt because it lies outside the main action-line. In my
estimation this is precisely the point. The fabrication occurs at a moment
when García has suffered the confusion, shame and humiliation caused by
his previous lies, and has demonstrated the degree of his commitment. It is
addressed to the person he should have been most honest with: his trusted
servant, the “secretario de su alma,” and it takes him in: a mortification for
the rather know-all Tristán. The lie completes the graduated pattern of those
deceived –a lady unknown to him; a not very close friend; his father and
now Tristán. As Lola Josa comments: “Mentirle hasta a su propio criado es el
colmo de García” (183). This is the moment of truth that indicates clearly
that Garcia is incorregible, at least within the timescale of the play.16 It
proves to the audience that he has not renounced lying, that it is more than a
juvenile aberration but a serious character flaw, and that he does not deserve
to get off the hook. Willard King is right in declaring that “Don García es
condenado… por haberse empedernido en el vicio” (192).
We should now return to the question posed by the dichotomy between
García’s lies and the mistake of identity. Evidently there is a disconnect
between the two, for, as critics from Antonio Castro Leal (136) onward have
made clear, it is the mistake of identity, not García’s lying, that brings about
the denouement. Mary Gaylord points out, quite rightly, that lying, as delib-
erate deception, and simple error are different categories, the first operating
in temporal sequence and the second in causal sequence (226). Thus the
problem of whether García should be held responsible and punished at the
end of the play causes unease and the ending is seen to be unjust or harsh, in
Gaylord’s words, “the forceful, almost violent imposition of restraint” (224). 
This is where the concept of “poetic justice,” in an attenuated form,
comes in. According to most definitions,17 poetic justice does not mean an
automatic retribution for specific actions, in a mechanical working-out of
cause and effect. It is rather that a given course of behavior will in the long
run and in an oblique way bring its own consequence: the individual con-
cerned will be, in Shakespeare’s phrase, “hoist with his own petard” (Hamlet,
3, 4). Without García’s continued mendacity it would indeed have resulted
severe and unjust if events had been allowed to take their course, but penaliz-
ing an unreformed character for continuous errors has a moral appropriate-
ness and a respectable pedigree. The ”final lie takes away the “arbitrariness”
of an “ending [that] seems perplexingly untidy” (Gaylord 224, 236) andRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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effective stage action.
The course of the lie to Tristán is ended by yet another dramatic anagno-
risis, when the man who is reputed to have been mortally wounded suddenly
appears. The lying continues now in a preposterous fashion with the pathetic
story of the healing ointment, the Hebrew formula and García’s proficiency
in languages. For the first time his lying is not believed by its recipient; the
patent falsehoods are not just dismissed but mocked at by Tristán. The char-
acters are now at one with the audience. The accumulated falsehoods can
only be seen as bringing into contempt, in a quite demeaning conclusion, his
exuberant career of invention. García is revealed on the stage, in the presence
of his servant, as a foolish and arrogant braggart.
In the diatribe that follows from the ill-used don Beltrán, converted igno-
miniously into the “pregonero de tu infamia” (2908), García is publicly
humiliated before his servant, though he is as impervious to his shame as
Tristán is fearful of the consequences. Even now, in his less than respectful
explanation to his father, García offers no excuse for lying except its necessity
through love. Rather than accept any culpability or blame, he confesses only
to a mistake and ignorance:
Error fue, no fue delito; 
no fue culpa, fue ignorancia. (2928-29)
He puts the onus on Beltrán to put it right, and only by calling his trusted
retainer as a witness does he persuade the old man to seek Lucrecia’s hand on
his behalf. Through don Juan, Beltrán learns that the Salamanca marriage was
an invention. He at once dispenses another favor –the hábito de Calatrava–
that, with a final irony, enables Don Juan to marry Jacinta. Garcia, by no
means penitent or contrite is, to Tristán’s amazement, not unhappy with the
encounter: “Bien se ha hecho” (2972) is his self-satisfied comment. In neither
the exchange beween characters nor the action as viewed on the stage does
García reveal that he deserves anything but a clear and unequivocal escarmiento.
A gradual leisurely pace leads towards the desenlace as a sedate, long-
winded conversation takes place between the two old men, don Juan de
Luna and don Sancho, in the garden of the former’s house. Whicker views it
as a moment suggesting a new atmosphere of “friendship and concord” (75),
but it portends a coming storm. The tranquility is abruptly interrupted by
don Juan de Sosa seeking Jacinta’s hand, followed by the appearance of
García and don Beltrán. García is full of self-assurance, displayed in three
utterances. First, he disclaims any envy –the vice he had wrongly claimed toRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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enabled him to claim another, Jacinta, under his rival’s nose; second, in pro-
claiming triumphantly that “Yerros [not “engaños”] causados de amor,/
quien es cuerdo los perdona” (3061-62); and, third, in asserting blithely, dis-
counting his “mentiras,” that “Agora de mis verdades/ darán probanza las
obras” (3073-74).
All is thus prepared for the masterly final discomfiture, a very late anag-
norisis that is at the same time a final reversal, a peripety, enacted on the
stage, against the unrepentant hero. The traditional lineup of happy lovers
goes terribly wrong, as there takes place the dramatic positioning on scene of
seven characters, who each make incisive physical and verbal interventions.
García’s move towards Jacinta is countered by don Juan de Sosa and don Bel-
trán; then Lucrecia intervenes, waving the decisive letter she has received;
next comes a further agonized exclamation from don Beltrán before don
Juan de Sosa’s disdainfully dismissive lines:
Dadme, Jacinta, la mano, 
y daréis fin a estas cosas. (3087-88)
Commanded by her guardian, don Sancho, Jacinta happily gives her hand to
don Juan. Then they turn on García. First, his father, then don Juan de
Luna, demand menacingly that he accept Lucrecia, and once Tristán has
rubbed in the moral of García’s culpability and the inevitability of the out-
come, Garcia is obliged to cross the stage to give his hand to Lucrecia, with a
grudging “La mano doy, pues es fuerza” (3107). The whole process is accom-
plished with impeccable precision.
Finally, the question of the relation between García’s lying and society.
Paterson is perceptive in detecting the considerable background of social
content throughout the play: references to the mayorazgo, the hábito don
Juan aspires to and so on;18 and, as we have seen, he indicates acutely the
social references in the lies themselves. Tristán’s satirical account of sexual
behavior and his strictures on society’s propensity for concealment precede
García’s lying and are not dependent on them. Quite a number of references
to society occur in apparently casual remarks by the characters. Don Beltrán
denounces the mendacity of society, galanes follow fashion rather than reason
or law, the two ladies conduct much intrigue through their servants Isabel
and Camino. The operations of worldly prudence produce a considerable
amount of manipulation. García’s lying brings such behavior out in the open
and puts it under stress, but it is hardly admirable in itself. In fact, no one inRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
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tán is smug and materialistic.
The individual story of a vain youth precipitately launched into the corte
y villa is not at odds with what is happening in the society of the time. In the
dramatic portrayal of an aristocratic society its members meticulously protect
their individual interests by prudent behavior from which calculated deceit is
not excluded. Whicker perceptively sees deception in one form or another as
the essential element of the play, and distinguishes between “two different
forms of deception, one associated with imagination and desire and repre-
sented by García’s extravagant lies, and the other associated with understand-
ing and reason and represented by the prudent stratagems of Jacinta” (53).
The point is well taken, but in speaking of the latter as ‘honest deception”
(11) he is over-generous in my view to this prudently self-interested society.
Alarcón is evidently greatly preoccupied with this social world, and finds it a
worthy subject of satire and a continued source of irony. Whether his criti-
cism is positively reformist is not altogether clear; it is after all not his job as
a playwright to offer forthright solutions. My suspicion is that he has no false
illusions about the society he depicts, but no desire to confront this good
material for dramatic action with more than his sardonic wit.
García’s lies lend an exuberant imaginative flavor that gives the play its
liveliness; they also lay bear the disruptive (and entertaining) consequences
these fabrications have both for those he deceives and for García himself. For
all its humor there is an underlying moral problem that despite warnings,
rebuffs and frustrations García does not face. His punishment is evidently
severe but not crippling.19 Whether his recalcitrant mendacity will ever be
curbed in marriage to Lucrecia, who, as well as being “una buena moza”
(3106), knew what she was letting herself in for (or for that matter, what the
result would have been had he married Jacinta), we shall never know for
sure. The conclusion is an unexpected one, but it is meant to be, and it is
consequential. Unlike fine scholars like Riley and Gaylord, I do not find it
faulty. What is certain is that Alarcón succeeded in writing a comic master-
piece that at the same time as it posed serious moral issues at both the indi-
vidual and collective level exploited the qualities of the theatre to maintain a
forceful dramatic tension to the very end.
Notes
1. Alan Paterson in particular makes good use of the reversal criterion in his stimulating
study.RILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
154 RIBBANS. “LA VERDAD SOSPECHOSA”: LYING AND DRAMATIC STRUCTURE2. The disregard of stage techniques shown by purely literary readers in determining the
impact and hence the dramatic significance of plays is notorious. 
3. See, for instance, Dámaso de Frías y Bilboa’s Diálogo de la discreción (1579) (Whicker
57, n. 14).
4. There is also a mentira oficiosa that is entirely blameless: “Lo que se dice para conse-
guir algun fin que no perjudica a otro, ni él en sí es malo, como quando para que un
niño no vaya hácia algun paráge peligroso…” (2, 546).
5. All quotations, with line references, are given to the edition of Las paredes oyen; La
verdad sospechosa by Juan Oleza and Teresa Ferrer.
6. For stimulating observations on the differences between the two plays, see the Intro-
duction to the edition of Oleza and Ferrer (lxvi-lxx).
7. The fact that such imaginative falsehoods are equated with poetry by such theorists
as Huarte de San Juan and López Pinciano raises a fascinating subject that I cannot
pursue here: the degree to which García’s lies are related to literature, to the point of
becoming a metatheatre. John London is a representative example of this approach:
“el mundo ficticio de don García compite con el mundo teatral de Alarcón y ame-
naza su supremacía” (90). 
8. Covarrubias gives only the first sense: “es pasmarse y espantarse de algun efeto que
vee extraordinario, cuya causa inora” (43). The later Diccionario de autoridades gives
the two definitions of admiración, the connotation of “wonder” coming first: “El acto
de vér, y atender una cosa no conocida, y de causa ignorada con espanto, ó particular
observación. Se dice también lo que en sí mismo por su perfección o hermosura es
digno de ser admirado…” (1, 88).
9. Within the cult of fame “we see with frightful evidence a boundless ambition and
thirst after greatness, independent of all means and consequences” (Burckhardt 162).
10. Frederick de Armas has drawn attention to the parallel with Cervantes. See also Rib-
bans 2000 (192-94).
11. It is a grave case of sacrilege, according to the legend’s main propagator, Valerius
Maximus: “illa vero gloriae cupiditas sacrilega.” Leo Braudy calls him the “patron
saint of notoriety” (559) and equates him with Caligula and Nero. It is curious to
note that the authorities in Ephesus required, unsuccessfully, that Herostratus be not
named on pain of death.
12. Very like don Beltrán, Cervantes has Don Quixote say much the same about envy:
“¡Oh envidia, raíz de infinitos males y carcoma de las virtudes! Todos los vicios, San-
cho, traen un no sé qué de deleite consigo, pero el de la envidia no trae sino disgus-
tos, rencores y rabias” (603).
13. A more prudent man might have followed the example of Jacinta or his own imagi-
nary doña Sancha in temporizing about a potential marriage.
14. The income Lucrecia will inherit (“dos mil ducados”) is carefully indicated by
Camino (2, 1, 1133). Oleza and Ferrer point out that this makes her considerably
less wealthy than García, through don Beltrán, and possibly than Jacinta (220, 237).
15. The Diccionario de Autoridades defines “embuste” as “Mentira disfrazada con artifi-
cio, para engañar y enredar” and “embustero” as “La persona que engaña y procura
engañar, fingiendo embustes y mentiras” (2, 396). The term “embarrador” (1974) is
even stronger: “el uso desta voz es regularmente metaphórico, llamando EmbarradorRILCE 26.1 (2010) 139-156
RIBBANS. “LA VERDAD SOSPECHOSA”: LYING AND DRAMATIC STRUCTURE 155ál que no procede con lisura en los negócios, y los maneja con dobléz y trato
engañoso…” (2, 383).
16. Significantly, Corneille does not aim at this effect by placing this lie earlier, in Act 4,
1, before the denouement is imminent.
17. For example, “In literature, an outcome in which vice is punished and virtue
rewarded, usually in a manner peculiarly or ironically appropriate” (Encyclopedia Bri-
tannica, my emphasis). In the not uncontroversial application of poetic justice to the
Spanish Golden Age theatre, the outstanding figure is A. A. Parker. I remain con-
vinced that in their essentials Parker’s arguments are applicable to La verdad sospe-
chosa. See Ribbans, “Lying” (1973: 212-13).
18. He is surely mistaken, however, in attributing the post of corregidor to García rather
than to el Letrado (362, 367n).
19. One critic, by exalting unduly Lucrecia’s merits, claims that García “escapa con una
‘admonestación’ que resultará en un enlace feliz” (Fothergill-Payne 595).
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